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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
GOVERNING LAW 
The following statutory provisions are involved in the outcome of this appeal: 
U.C.A. §§ 78-12-25(3); 78-12-26(3). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
In response to the Complaint, each of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (R. 
29, 56, 51.) Carson's Motion to Dismiss included additional documents, including an 
Agreement among Thomas, Russell and P.R.P., and a series of deeds from the lot closings 
that are at the heart of the claim. (R.82, ^  60-64, R.44-50, Addendum, pp. 15-22.) Russell 
responded with a Memorandum (R.5 8) and an Amended Complaint (R.72), but did not file 
any request to strike any of the additional documents contained in Carson's Motion to 
Dismiss. (R.58-71.) 
A hearing was had on the motions to dismiss on April 29, 2002, at which time the 
court dismissed the Amended Complaint. (R.149.) During oral argument, plaintiffs' 
counsel made the following comments: 
1 
. . . I want to be candid, because if the Court does not think 
that I have what is, I think, common law variety fraud in the 
classic sense, then I don't want to go any further. 
As to the procedural context, I do believe that it has to be 
considered most appropriately under the motion to dismiss 
standards. There were attachments made to [Carson's 
memorandum (R.40-50)]. There was a code section, there 
was an agreement, and there was some warranty deeds. 
They're irrelevant to my theory of the case. They're not in 
affidavit form, but I don't think it matters.. ." (R.207 at p. 
23.) 
Plaintiffs' counsel did not ask for leave to file a second Amended Complaint. 
Russell made an objection to the proposed Order of Dismissal, but did not raise any 
issue with respect to the documents that were a part of Carson's motion to dismiss. (R. 
155-158.) The objection was resolved pursuant to a Minute Entry dated June 10, 2002, 
and the Order of Dismissal was signed that same date. (R. 191-194.) 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. Prior to November, 1996, when the Real Estate Purchase Contracts that are 
the subject of the Amended Complaint were entered into, Russell and Thomas were 
partners in a limited liability company, P.R.P. (R.72, ^  5, 18.) Thomas was the manager 
of P.R.P., and an agent of Russell. (R.73, <|[ 5.) Carson and Bustos were real estate agents 
for Wardley Better Homes and Gardens. (R.74, *{ 10.) 
2. In the summer of 1996, Joel Carson showed John Thomas lots located at 
Saratoga Springs that were available for development and sale. (R.76, ffl[26,29.) In fact, 
P.R.P. did not make an offer to purchase the lots until after C.M.T., an entity which 
2 
Russell alleges was a sham, had contracted to purchase the lots for $25,000.00 per lot. 
(R.77, ffi[ 33, 50.) After C.M.T. contracted to purchase the lots, it resold them pursuant 
to a separate contract to P.R.P. on November 8, 1996 at a price of $30,000.00 per lot. 
(R.79, A. Complaint, fflf 44,45.) 
3. When Russell and Thomas separated in April, 1997, Russell agreed to pay 
P.R.P. not $30,000.00 per lot, but $38,000.00 per lot. See Russell v. Thomas, 2000 Ut. Ct. 
App. 82, at U 3. (Thomas retained all of the assets of P.R.P. other than the lots.) The first 
lots were closed in July, 1997, with deeds being issued from Saratoga to C.M.T., and from 
C.M.T. to Russell/Packard. (R.207, p. 39, and R.44, 46.) 
4. C.M.T. had no relationship to either Saratoga or P.R.P. (Amended 
Complaint, f 52.) There is no allegation in either complaint that the defendants Carson, 
or Bustos ever misrepresented the (lack of) relationship between C.M.T. and Saratoga to 
Russell. The alleged misrepresentation plead in ^ 65 of the Amended Complaint is as 
follows: "Defendants represented to Saratoga that C.M.T. was part of, affiliated with, 
or owned by plaintiffs." The first cause of action goes on to allege that because Saratoga 
believed C.M.T. was affiliated with P.R.P., that "Saratoga sold the lots to C.M.T.." (A. 
Complaint, R.72, ^67.) 
5. There is no allegation in the Amended Complaint that Bustos made any 
misrepresentations to Russell. There is no allegation that Bustos acted as an agent for 
either Russell or P.R.P., or that he owed any duty to them. (Cf. R.72 at \ 22.) 
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6. Russell admitted in the Amended Complaint (R.81, f 58 and 59), that 
plaintiffs were placed on inquiry notice in the spring of 2000 that C.M.T. was not under 
the control of Saratoga Springs. (R.82 at ^ 58.) Russell also acknowledged, at page 11 
(R.69) of plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, that they were 
placed on inquiry notice regarding the alleged fraud in the spring of 2000. During the 
course of oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel further acknowledged that Russell had 
discovered the alleged fraud in 2000 during "The final take down of the last 12 lots where 
someone in Saratoga's organization is going through the paperwork . . .". (Page 32 of 
Transcript, R. 207.) 
7. This action is one of three that have transpired out of the same transactions. 
The other two cases, Wardley v. Carson, et.al., Civil No. 000904257 (filed May, 2000), 
and Saratoga Springs Development v. Carson, et.al, Civil No. 000904607 (filed June, 
2000, certified copy of Complaint is a part of the Addendum, p. 1), remain pending in the 
Third District Court. Both of those cases were filed long before Russell filed this action 
on November 30, 2001. 
8. Russell and the defendant John Thomas are not strangers to this Court. The 
Agreement between them that was filed with Carson's Motion to Dismiss (R.40, 
Addendum, p. 15) was before this Court in an appeal decided on March 23,2000, Russell 
v. Thomas, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 82, 999 P.2d 1244. The facts in the earlier appeal were 
not disputed (fn. l,999P.2dat 1245), and the holding in that case was that the April 1997 
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contract between Russell and Thomas (the "Agreement"), which involved the same lots 
at issue here, was not a conveyance of an interest in property, but merely a promise to do 
so in the future. Id. at 1248, \ 14. During the course of oral argument on the motions to 
dismiss, the Court placed Russell on notice that this Agreement would bear on the 
standing issue. (Transcript, R.207 at p. 35.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' Complaint on the following basis: that 
the plaintiffs had not brought their claims in a timely manner under the applicable statutes 
of limitations; that the plaintiffs lacked standing; that the plaintiffs had failed to state a 
claim for fraud; and that there was no civil action for commercial bribery. (R. 193,194.) 
The four year statute of limitations, U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), applies to all of the 
plaintiffs9 claims, except for its fraud claim. This statute does not have an internal 
discovery rule. Under Utah case law, where causes of action could have been discovered 
by a reasonable plaintiff within the 4 years allowed by the statute of limitations, that 
plaintiff is required to bring its action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. 
In its complaints, the Russell plaintiffs (referred to collectively hereinafter simply as 
Russell) admitted having been placed on constructive notice of the claims in the spring of 
2000, prior to the expiration of the four year statute of limitations. Because Russell failed 
to file its action before the 4 years expired, their claims for beach of fiduciary duty, civil 
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conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship, 
commercial bribery, and intentional interference are all barred by U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3). 
Russells' fraud claim fails as a matter of law. Even though Russell filed an 
Amended Complaint, that pleading did not assert the claim with the particularity required 
by Rule 9. In addition, the facts are such that Russell could not plead an adequate claim 
of fraud. Russell was not a party to the transactions. As a matter of kw, fraud claims are 
not assignable. The balance of Russells' claims were addressed by a contract between 
Russell and P.R.P., who was in fact the party to the transactions. That agreement did not 
assign any claims to Russell. Russell lacks standing to assert the fraud claims. In 
addition, Russells' fraud claims are barred by the statute of limitations in U.C.A. § 78-12-
26(3) as a matter of law. Russells' own chain of title revealed all of the information it 
needed to know of the alleged fraud. 
Utah does not recognize a civil claim for commercial bribery, and the trial court 
was justified in dismissing that cause of action. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
Appellees acknowledge that for purposes of motions to dismiss, trial courts must 
accept the factual allegations in the [Amended] Complaint as true and that dismissal 
should be affirmed only if it clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of their cause of action. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Ut.App. 
1994). 
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (R.72) asserts the following causes of action: 
(i) fraud; 
(ii) breach of fiduciary duty by Thomas and Carson; 
(iii) civil conspiracy to defraud; 
(iv) commercial bribery; 
(v) unjust enrichment; 
(vi) conversion and misappropriation of proprietary property; 
(vii) breach of principal agency relation as to Carson and Thomas; 
(viii) intentional interference with prospective economic relations. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS BASED UPON THE STATUTES OF 
LIMITATION, 
A. Plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, unjust 
enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship, and intentional 
interference are all barred by the four year statute of limitations. 
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The parties agree that the four year statute of limitations, U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3), 
applies to each of the foregoing claims. (Russell Brief, p. 11.) What the parties do not 
agree on, however, is when this four year statute of limitations expired. 
In Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, at % 15,28 P. 3d 1271, the Supreme Court observed 
as follows: 
Certain circumstances, however, raise the possibility that the 
discovery rule may toll the limitations period "until the 
discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action." 
Id. The discovery rule is applicable when it is mandated by 
statute, when a defendant has concealed a plaintiffs cause of 
action, or when exceptional circumstances exist.1 (at 1275) 
i. U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) does not mandate application of the discovery rule. 
U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) does not include what the Supreme Court has described as an 
"internal" discovery rule. See Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 at 55 (Utah 1996). This 
is a significant distinction, because without the internal discovery rule, if Russell became 
aware of their damage and possible causes of action before the four years allowed in 
U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) expired, they were obligated to bring their claims within those four 
years. Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064 at 1065 (Utah 1992). 
In the trial court, the defendants argued that even looking back to November, 1996, 
that being the longest period possible and thus the most advantageous for Russell, that 
Russells' admission (R.81, A. Complaint, Tf 58) that they had inquiry notice in the spring 
1
 In their memorandum before the trial court, Russell conceded that the "exceptional 
circumstances", or third prong of the discovery rule does not apply in this case. (R.67, fn. 9.) 
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of 2000 required them to file these claims (breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, 
unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship, and intentional 
interference) by November of 2000, four years from the alleged wrongdoing. 
ii. The "concealment'' exception does not apply in this case. In Warren v. 
Provo City Corp., 838 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme court observed as 
follows: 
The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially 
a claim of equitable estoppel...Therefore, in order to invoke 
the concealment version of the discovery rule it must be 
shown that given the defendants actions, a reasonable 
plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory 
period, (at 1130.) 
Russell has not alleged that Carson or Bustos did anything to conceal the alleged 
fraud after the spring of 2000. Indeed, as discussed hereinafter, the alleged fraud was 
fully disclosed in Russells' own chain of title. 
The following analysis was laid out in Hill v. Alfred, 2001 Ut. 16, ^  17, 28 P.3d 
1271 at 1276. 
[Where] a plaintiff alleges that a defendant took affirmative 
steps to conceal a plaintiffs cause of action... the plaintiff 
can avoid the full operation of the discovery rule by making 
a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then 
demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a 
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim 
earlier. 
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In other words, under each of the first two exceptions created by the "discovery 
rule/' if Russell, as a reasonable person, could have learned of facts in time to file the 
action within the statutory period, the discovery rule will not extend the time for filing. 
Russell has argued (p.13 of its Brief) that U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) is "tolled" during 
the period they claim to have been unaware of the claims. Tolling does not occur under 
this statute. 
It is apparent from this argument that Russell still does not accept the principle 
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Brigham Young University v. Paulsen 
Construction, 744 P.2d 1370 at 1374 (Utah 1987), that "the Discovery Rule has no 
application when an action could easily have been filed between the date of discovery and 
the end of the limitation." 
This rule was applied to U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) in Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 
823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992). In Atwood, the Supreme Court determined that where the 
cause of action was discovered in the spring of 1998 and could have been filed before the 
statute of limitations ran in October of 1988, that the discovery rule did not extend the 
time for filing the action (at 1064). In short, there is no tolling under U.C.A. § 78-12-
25(3) if the facts giving rise to the claim were or reasonably could have been known prior 
to the expiration of the four year statute. 
iii. Russell has admitted he knew of his claims within the statutory period, and 
the trial court was not obligated to engage in fact finding to determine when Russell 
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should have discovered its claims. Russell has alleged that the "concealment" was a 
failure to disclose to him (as opposed to P.R.P.) that C.M.T. was not owned or controlled 
by Saratoga. (R.80, f 54.) In the trial court, Russell stated in his memorandum opposing 
the Motion to Dismiss (R.64, If 13) that at the time of the last closing, an accountant for 
Saratoga "discovered the C.M.T. transaction, alerted Saratoga's representatives, who in 
turn alerted and placed on inquiry notice the sham transaction to plaintiffs, and the 
successors in interest to the properties' right, title and interest and the claims for relief 
asserted herein, in the spring 2000 time period...". (See R.81, ^ 55-59.) There are no 
allegations that any time beyond the spring of 2000 was needed to discover facts or the 
alleged causes of action, or that any alleged concealment continued beyond that date. 
Russells' pleadings are, at a minimum, an admission that the defendants made no 
misrepresentations to or concealed facts from them after the spring of 2000. Absent 
misrepresentations, there can be no showing that defendants' actions prevented discovery 
of the causes of action after the spring of 2000. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 
1125 (Utah 1992). 
There was no argument advanced before the trial court, either in pleadings or at 
oral argument, that (i) the plaintiffs needed to engage in a fact finding mission on the issue 
of when they should have discovered additional facts, or (ii) that plaintiffs had not 
discovered additional facts necessary for their claims until some later date. (R.207.) 
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The plaintiffs have asserted for the first time in their Appellate Brief that even 
though they knew of the alleged concealment in the spring of 2000, that "they did not 
discover actual facts forming the basis for their causes of action until after the November 
7, 2001 (2000?) deadline." (Appellants' Brief at p. 17.) Because this argument was not 
advanced at the trial court, and was not a part of the allegations in the Amended 
Complaint, as a matter of law, it should not be considered at this stage of the proceedings. 
That this argument is first made at this late stage of the litigation is particularly 
surprising in light of the following circumstances. On June 22, 2000, the plaintiff and 
Saratoga Springs entered into a "Real Property Purchase Agreement" (R.40, Addendum 
p. 23) which refers on page 4, subparagraph (e), to a civil action in the Third District 
Court, 000904607CN (which is entitled Saratoga Springs Development v. Carson, et.al., 
see Statement of Facts, supra, ^7.) (A certified copy of the Complaint, as well as the 
June, 2000 Agreement are in the Addendum, pp. 1 and 23.) That action names Carson and 
Bustos, among others, as defendants. The June, 2000 Agreement was signed by 
Russell/Packard, the plaintiff in this action. Larry Russell testified under oath in his 
deposition in the Saratoga action that the Agreement was prepared by Michael Carlston, 
one of his attorneys in this action. (Russell deposition, p. 40, dated October 30, 2001, 
Addendum, p. 38.) While the Saratoga Complaint and Larry Russell's deposition pages 
were not filed in the trial court, they would have been filed had Russell argued there that 
they needed time beyond the statute of limitations to discover additional facts. 
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The allegations made in this action by Russell are virtually identical to those made 
in June, 2000 by Saratoga. Plaintiffs9 counsel in this appeal has an affirmative obligation 
to know whether or not the allegations and factual contentions that they now make for the 
first time on appeal have any evidentiary support. Obviously, they do not. In fact, the 
June, 2000 Agreement goes on and provides for a division of the spoils if Saratoga 
prevails in its action against these defendants, and states in paragraph 7.10 that Saratoga 
and Russell/Packard "will attempt to consolidate into one action any legal claims they may 
bring against C.M.T. or others...". In other words, Russell knew not later than June 22, 
2000 of all of the allegations and claims now being asserted against Bustos, Carson and 
Thomas in this action. Thus, it clearly appears that Russell has not alleged and can cannot 
prove any set of facts which warrants an extension of U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3) beyond 
November of 2000. See Wright v. University of Utah, supra. 
Russells' argument is further undermined by the fact that by the spring of 2000, all 
Russell had to do was check its own chain of title or speak to the accountant who gave it 
information (R.81, ^ 55) and they would have learned that Saratoga was deeding 
properties to C.M.T., who in turn was deeding them to Russell/Packard. Russell could 
have made additional inquiries of Saratoga in the spring of 2000, as they acknowledged 
doing in paragraph 60 of the Amended Complaint (R. 72). In short, the only reason it may 
have taken Russell Packard the sixteen plus months beyond the spring of 2000 that it now 
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argues was needed to discover the additional facts it claims on appeal were necessary to 
initiate this action was their own lack of diligence. 
The case of Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16,28 P.3d 1271 is not helpful to Russell. In 
Hilly the plaintiff set forth a litany of heroic efforts taken to discover facts actively 
concealed from her which were essential to her claims. In this action, Russell has alleged 
and acknowledged they learned of the essential facts many months before the statute of 
limitations had expired. Moreover, these additional "facts" were always a matter of public 
record in their own chain of title. 
The argument that more time was needed also fails under the reasoning of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992). In that case, 
the Court held that if there were no representations by the defendant, there could be no 
showing that the defendant's actions prevented the discovery of the cause of action, (at 
1130.) In this case, Russell has conceded that defendants' alleged concealment ended in 
the spring of 2000. (R.81, f^ 59.) Under the rule applied in the Warren case, after the 
spring of 2000 there can be no showing that defendants' actions prevented the discovery 
of the claims that were filed in November, 2001. 
For all of these reasons, the plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil 
conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion, breach of principal agency relationship, and 
intentional interference are barred by U.C.A. § 78-12-25(3). The trial court's dismissal 
of these claims should be affirmed as to all defendants. 
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II. RUSSELLS' FRAUD CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. Russells' fraud allegations do not state a claim for relief. 
Plaintiffs have not alleged that Carson or Bustos made any misrepresentation to 
them. For example, in paragraph 31 of the Amended Complaint (R.77), Russell alleges 
that"... Carson, Thomas and Bustos continued to develop the scheme by continuing to 
make overt acts and representations to Saratoga...". Other allegations of 
misrepresentations ostensibly made to Saratoga are contained in the Amended Complaint, 
R. 72, at K 35 and 65. 
Russell argues, without reference to any legal authority, that a misrepresentation 
ostensibly made to Saratoga triggers a right to relief in him if the purpose of the conduct 
was to induce him to act. (Brief, p. 22-23.) It is impossible to address the authority for 
this assertion when none is offered by Russell. The assertion is contrary to settled case 
authority. See, for example, Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298,301 (Utah 1978) (plaintiff 
must "prove the defendant knowingly misrepresented a material fact with intent to induce 
the plaintiff to act or refrain from action"); King v. Nevada Elec. Inv. Co., 893 F. Supp. 
1006,1012 (D. Utah 1993) (without proof of any affirmative, material misrepresentation 
by defendant to plaintiff, no fraud claim will lie). The allegations that Saratoga, not 
Russell, was induced to act does not support a fraud claim for Russell. (R.82, f 67, 68.) 
Another essential factor that Russell must hope this Court will ignore is that they 
were not a party to any of the November, 1996 transactions. Russell concedes, as they 
15 
must, that John Thomas was their agent and the manager of P.R.P., a Utah limited liability 
company. Russell was, at best, a member of an LLC. P.R.P. was the party to the 
November 1996 transactions. There is no allegation that P.R.P. was defrauded. 
Other potential allegations of misrepresentation directed to Carson or Bustos 
concede that they were made "through P.R.P." (See for example, A. Complaint, R. 72, 
<|fl[ 25,47.) Absent an allegation that Carson or Bustos made misrepresentations to Russell 
or Russell/Packard, no claim lies in favor of plaintiffs and against Bustos or Carson for 
fraud. See Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d at 275 (Ut. 1952). 
Russells' fraud claim against Carson and Bustos does not pass Rule 9, U. R. Civ. 
P. scrutiny. Under Rule 9, claims of fraud must be made with particularity. See Brown 
v. Wanless, 2001 UT App. 30, 18 P. 3d 1137. For example, there is no allegation that 
Russell was aware of the alleged misrepresentations made by Carson or Bustos to 
Saratoga at any time in 1996 or 1997. There is no allegation that any misrepresentation 
was made by Carson or Bustos to Russell. There is no allegation that Russell was induced 
to act by any alleged misrepresentation of Bustos or Carson. Even if such an allegation 
had been made, the fact that Thomas was the manager and agent for P.R.P. making 
decisions regarding the transaction undermines any contention that Russells' knowledge 
would have been of any legal significance. 
Russell has alleged that Thomas was, "at all material times a manager of an entity 
known as P.R.P., and an agent and a fiduciary of plaintiffs." (R. 73, f^ 5.) Thus, as a 
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matter of law, both Russell and P.R.P. were charged with the knowledge that Thomas had, 
which included the knowledge that C.M.T. and Saratoga were not the same entities (R. 78, 
U 37,38) and that the sales price of the lots from Saratoga to C.M.T. was $25,000.00. In 
a recent decision, Wardley v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ^ 16 to 19, the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the imputation of knowledge from a realtor (agent) to his principal broker 
(principal). It observed that "[a] principal is affected with constructive knowledge, 
regardless of actual knowledge, of all material facts of which its agent receives 
notice...while acting in the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, 
although the agent does not inform his principal thereof." (At ^  16.) Imputation applies 
in tort and contract actions. Wardley at ^  19. Applied to this case, so far as Carson and 
Bustos are concerned Russell is charged with whatever Thomas knew in the course of his 
duties as the manager of P.R.P. 
For these reasons, i) the absence of any allegation of a misrepresentation from 
Bustos or Carson to Russell, ii) the failure to meet the requirements of Rule 9, and iii) 
Russells' imputed knowledge, Russell has not and cannot state a cause of action in fraud 
against Bustos or Carson. 
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B. Russell lacks standing to assert fraud claims against Carson and Bustos. 
While the lack of standing argument would apply to the full range of Russells' 
claims, its discussion here is focused on the issue of Russells' fraud claim against Bustos 
and Carson.2 
In their initial complaint, Russell did not allege any facts which would have given 
them the right to pursue P.R.P.'s claims in their own name. In their Amended Complaint 
(R. 74, f 8), in apparent response to this argument, Russell alleged that the "right, title, 
and interest to this litigation..." was assigned to them. Russell thus concedes that the 
claims they are asserting were assigned to them by P.R.P. 
Russell is not in a position to pursue assigned claims against Carson and Bustos 
because P.R.P., as a matter of law, did not have a fraud claim against Carson or Bustos. 
Because Thomas was alleged to be a part of all of the circumstances giving rise 
to the claims, P.R.P. itself has no fraud claims against Carson or Bustos. Even if claims 
did exist in favor of P.R.P., all of P.RJP.'s purported fraud claims are cut off by the statute 
of limitations because of the knowledge of its agent and manager, Thomas, in 1996 that 
CMT was not the same as either P.R.P. or Saratoga. See Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 
892 P. 2d 14 (Ut. App. 1995). 
2
 Carson and Bustos join in the argument set forth in Thomas' brief on the standing issue, 
but do not repeat it in this brief. 
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Another circumstance undermines Russells' standing. Russell alleges that he was 
a 50 percent owner of P.R.P., that P.R.P. was a Utah limited liability company, and that 
P.R.P. has since been dissolved. (R. 74, A. Complaint, ^[8.) P.R.P. expired on April 23, 
2001,60 days after its delinquency date, which was February 22,2001. (R.48.) Because 
P.R.P. expired before the new L.L.C. statute became effective, the old L.L.C. statute 
applies. (U.C.A. § 48-2c-101, et. seq., effective July 1,2001.) By the end of April, 2001 
when P.R.P. expired, P.R.P. was barred by law from bringing its own suit. (See U.C.A. 
§ 48-2b-142(9), (repealed).) In other words, if Russell has an "assigned" claim, as he 
alleges, it died when P.R.P. expired. 
Finally, this Court can determine, as a matter of law, that Russell did not acquire 
any fraud claim from P.R.P. by virtue of the April 1997 Agreement. From the plain 
language of the April 1997 Agreement (R. 40), which has already been before this Court 
for consideration in a separate matter, Russell Russell/Packard Development, Saratoga 
Springs Development, etalv. John Thomas andP.R. Development, 2000 Ut. Ct. App. 82, 
999 P.2d 1244, it is clear that Russell was acquiring the Saratoga lots, and nothing more. 
(R. 40: "Whereas, Russell is willing to pay P.R.P. to acquire the Property.... P.R.P. agrees 
to assign to Russell all of its right, title and interest in the Contract and its right to acquire 
the Saratoga Property at the time of closing.") In the same Agreement fl[ 3), Russell 
disclaimed any further interest in P.R.P. 
Fraud is not a contract claim. Fraud is not the Saratoga Property. 
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In short, if there was a fraud claim arising out of the transaction, it stayed with and 
died with P.R.P., and was not transferred to Russell. 
C. Even if a fraud claim were stated which Russell has standing to assert, it is 
time barred. 
At the trial court, the defendants argued, based on the deeds dated July 3, 1997 
(Addendum, pp. 15-18) from the first closing under the November contract between 
C.M.T. and P.R.P., and U.C.A. § 57-3-102 (recorded documents impart notice to all 
persons of their contents from the time of recording) that the fraud statute of limitations 
began to run in July, 1997 when those first deeds were recorded. This Court recently 
recognized the constructive notice created by a properly recorded document. .See 
Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Assoc, 2002 UT App 332, ^ | 23, 24. As a 
result of the constructive knowledge arising out of the recorded deeds from Saratoga to 
C.M.T. and then from C.M.T. to Russell/Packard, the statute of limitations on Russells' 
claim that they were defrauded by the failure of Carson or Bustos to disclose the separate 
existence of Saratoga and C.M.T. began to run in July of 1997 and expired not later than 
July 2000, approximately 16 months before the complaint was filed. 
Russells9 argument assumes that his loss was triggered by the execution of the 
November, 1996 agreement. Russell was not a party to the November, 1996 contract. No 
land exchanged hands in November, 1996. In fact, as was discussed at the trial court and 
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not disputed, the first closing of any sale under the real estate purchase contracts occurred 
in July, 1997. (R.44-47.) 
Russell acknowledged in the trial court in his memorandum, (R. 68) that "the entire 
scheme required concealment of the sham middle man, C.M.T., and it's non-affiliation 
with either the true seller or the true buyer." Yet, Russell ignores the indisputable fact that 
C.M.T.'s existence and role in the transaction is reflected in each deed which he received 
for each of the lots he purchased. The two deeds (R. 44-47) used to complete each 
transaction, the first from Saratoga Springs to C.M.T. and the second from C.M.T. to 
P.R.P., as a matter of law constitute notice of the separateness of C.M.T. and Saratoga 
Springs Development. U.C.A. § 57-3-102. This factor alone placed Russell on 
constructive notice not later than July, 1997, of the separateness of C.M.T. and Saratoga 
and defeats Russells' claim that the discovery rule extends the statute of limitations on his 
fraud claim. 
The discovery rule relied upon by Russell to extend the statute of limitations does 
not contemplate or require actual knowledge of the alleged fraud. In Baldwin v. Burton, 
850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the discovery rule under 
§78-12-26(3) as follows: 
The words 'until the discovery [of fraud]' are generally 
interpreted as meaning from the time the fraud was actually 
known or could have been discovered through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence. Specifically addressing § 78-12-
26(3), this Court stated that the three year statute of 
limitations for fraud 'begins to run from the time the person 
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entitled to the property knows, or by reasonable diligence and 
inquiry should know, the relevant facts and 'of the fraud 
perpetrated against him. Furthermore, we have previously 
observed: 'The means of knowledge is equivalent to 
knowledge. A party who has opportunity of knowing the 
facts constituting the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and 
afterwards allege a want of knowledge that arose by reason 
of his own laches and negligence.' (Emphasis added.) 
In the Baldwin case, the Burtons were attempting to execute on a judgment lien and the 
question was whether or not a prior (allegedly fraudulent) transfer of property should have 
been discovered by Burton's in their effort to levy on a judgment. The allegedly 
fraudulent transfer had been recorded at the time Burton's judgment was entered. The 
Supreme Court observed that Burton should have searched property records for property 
upon which to levy when his judgment was entered, and the Court concluded that the 
transfer should have been discovered when Burton obtained his judgment. 
Had a search been made, exercising reasonable diligence and 
proper prudence, [Burton] surely would have uncovered the 
transfer from Wood to his wife. Discovery of the transfer 
would then have sparked further inquiry on the part of 
Burton. If such inquiry had been pursued, the Burton's 
would have discovered facts surrounding the alleged 
fraudulent conveyance. At the very least, discovery of the 
transfer should have incited suspicion of fraud. . . 
However, it is not necessary for a claimant to know every 
fact about his fraud claim before the statute begins to run. 
The means of knowledge were available to the Burtons, and 
upon obtaining the judgment against Willard Wood, they 
should have discovered facts surrounding the alleged fraud. 
(Emphasis added.) 
850P.2datll97. 
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U.C.A. § 57-3-102 provides that the recording of instruments imparts notice to all 
persons of their contents. The deeds (R. 44-47) reflect that at the time of the initial 
transfer of property to Russell, the Saratoga Springs deed to C.M.T. Development, Inc. 
was recorded, and revealed the separate transaction from Saratoga to C.M.T. As a matter 
of law, Russell is held to know of the existence of the two separate closings and all of the 
information that he could have obtained in connection therewith. 
The case of Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16,28 P.3d 1271 upon which Russell relies is 
inapposite to the facts on fraud statute of limitations as well. In Hill, it appears that the 
defendants actively concealed or mispresented critical facts to the plaintiff that created her 
causes of action against them. The claims did not involve recorded documents. In this 
case, concealment was not possible because the existence and separateness of C.M.T. 
from Saratoga was clearly revealed in the chain of title to the very lots Russell acquired. 
U.C.A. § 57-3-102 mandates that Russell had notice of the prior recorded deed from 
Saratoga Springs Development to C.M.T., and as discussed in the Baldwin, case, supra, 
that notice included all of the information that would have been acquired through 
reasonable diligence and inquiry regarding that deed. In fact, Russells' brief on appeal 
concedes that the knowledge of the alleged fraud came from sources available to it. That 
inquiry would have revealed the two-step transaction and given Russell all the information 
they claim was needed. 
Russell was, as a matter of law, aware of the separateness of Saratoga and C.M.T. 
not later than July, 1997 when the first closing occurred. Thus, the three year statute of 
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limitations expired in July 2000. This action was not filed until November of 2001, nearly 
one and one-half years after the statute of limitations had expired. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S COMMERCIAL BRIBERY CLAIM FAILS AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, 
Russell has asserted a claim of commercial bribery against all defendants. This 
issue has been briefed by Thomas, and Carson and Bustos join in that argument. 
IV. RUSSELL HAS NOT STATED ANY CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF AGAINST BUSTOS. 
Plaintiffs claims against Bustos are even more remote than those asserted against 
Carson and Thomas, and in addition to the foregoing reasons, fail for the following 
additional reasons. 
Plaintiffs' first cause of action against Bustos alleges fraud based on 
misrepresentations ostensibly made to Saratoga. There is no allegation that Bustos ever 
communicated with plaintiffs while the transactions were occurring. In other words, there 
was no representation made by Bustos to plaintiffs. Bustos is not identified as a 
defendant in either the second cause of action (breach of a fiduciary duty) or the seventh 
cause of action (breach of principal agency relationship). This is an acknowledgment by 
the plaintiffs that Bustos owed them no fiduciary duty. 
The balance of the claims against Bustos are barred for all of the reasons discussed 
above. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court dismissing the Amended 
Complaint should be affirmed. 
DATED this W day of February, 2003. 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Joel Carson 
i. Adamson 
DAOT, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorney for William Bustos 
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SCALLEY & READING, P.C 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
Facsimile: (801) 531-7968 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SARATOGA SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOEL M. CARSON, an individual; 
CHARLES PEREZ, an individual; 
WILLIAM BUSTOS, an individual; POE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, LLC, a 
limited liability company; CHARLES 
PEREZ, dba CMT, INC.; CMT, INC., 
currently a California Corporation; NEXUS 
INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company; ARISTOTLE 
INVESTMENTS, INC., P.C, a Utah 
corporation; BUSTOS ENTERPRISES, 
LTD., a limited partnership; WILLIAM A. 
BUSTOS FAMILY TRUST; CORAZON 
M. TORRES, an individual; MARTIN 
DELGADO, an individual; and JOHN 
DOES 1 to 10, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. ODO°{0%&} 
J u d S e L\M£Afc^ 
Plaintiff Saratoga Springs Development, LLC, (SSD), by and through counsel 
hereby complains, alleges and contends against Defendants Joel M. Carson ("Carson"), an 
FILiO DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 0 9 2000 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
8 * . . 
Deputy Cleric 
individual; Charles Perez ("Perez"), an individual, William Bustos ("Bustos"), an individual; 
Poe Investment Company, LLC, ("Poe") formerly a limited liability company; CMT, Inc. 
("CMT"), currently a California corporation; Nexus Investments, L.L.C. ("Nexus"), currently a 
Utah limited liability company; Aristotle Investments, Inc. P.C. ("Aristotle"), currently a Utah 
corporation; Bustos Enterprises, LTD. ("Bustos Enterprises"), currently a Utah limited 
partnership; the William A. Bustos Family Trust ("Bustos Trust"); Corazon M. Torres ("Torres"), 
an individual; Martin Delgado ("Delgado"), an individual; and JOHN DOES 1 to 10, as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4. 
2. Venue of this action is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-4. 
PARTIES 
3. SSD is a Utah Limited Liability Company in good standing licensed to do business in the 
State of Utah. 
4. Carson is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
5. Perez is an individual who at one time resided in Salt Lake County, Utah, and who 
entered a contract in the name of CMT, in Salt Lake County, Utah, for the sale of real 
property in this State. CMT does not exist pursuant to the laws of Utah and is NOT 
legally authorized to do business or enter contracts within this State as a domestic or 
foreign corporation or other legal entity. 
6. Bustos is an individual residing within Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is a principal 
in Nexus, Aristotle, Bustos Enterprises and the Bustos Trust. He also was a member of 
Poe, when it was in existence. 
Poe was formerly a limited liability company organized within the State of Utah on or 
about July 19, 1996, but was involuntarily dissolved on or about August 22, 1997. When 
Poe was formed Carson and Bustos were its members. 
CMT, Inc. is currently a California corporation in good standing that was not organized 
at the time of the events, facts and circumstances giving rise to the claims asserted 
herein. Since that time, however, CMT, Inc. has been organized pursuant to the laws 
of the State of California, but to date has not been authorized to do business as a 
foreign corporation within the State of Utah. 
Nexus has been a limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of 
Utah since January 14, 1997. Nexus, however, was not organized in or recognized by 
the State of Utah as a legal entity at the time of the events, facts and circumstances 
giving rise to the claims asserted herein. Nexus' members are Aristotle and Bustos 
Enterprises. 
Aristotle has been a Utah corporation in good standing which has been authorized to do 
business in the State of Utah since January 7, 1993. Bustos is Aristotle's President and 
only Director currently on record with the State of Utah. 
Bustos Enterprises is a limited partnership in good standing that has been organized 
pursuant to the laws of Utah since December 31, 1996. Its members are William 
Bustos, Trustee and the William A. Bustos Family Trust. Bustos Enterprises, however, 
was not recognized by the State of Utah as a legal entity at the time of the events, facts 
and circumstances giving rise to the claims asserted herein. 
Torres is an individual who currently resides in the State of California and is a principal 
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in and director of CMT. He, individually, with the other Defendants, and or in the 
name of CMT, entered into a contract in the State of Utah to purchase and sell real 
property located in Utah County, State of Utah. 
13. Delgado is an individual who currently resides in the State of California and is a 
principal in and director of CMT. He, individually, and or in the name of CMT 
entered into a contract in the State of Utah to purchase and sell real property located in 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
14. John Does one through ten are as of yet unknown individuals and other legal and/or 
illegal entities that individually or through authorized agents engaged in, conspired to 
commit or facilitated in the commission of the wrongs alleged herein. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
15. At all times relevant to the facts and circumstances alleged in this Complaint, Carson was 
a real estate agent licensed by the State of Utah to conduct real estate activities in Utah. 
16. In January of 1996, SSD owned 72 building lots located in Saratoga Springs, Lehi City, 
Utah County ("the Property"). 
17. In the summer of 1996, SSD retained Wardley Corporation dba Wardley Better Homes 
and Gardens Real Estate ("Wardley") to help market the Property. 
18. In the summer and fall of 1996 SSD negotiated with PRP Development, L.C., ("PRP") a 
Utah Limited Liability Company over the sale of the Property. In those negotiations SSD 
was represented by Dan Cary ("Cary") and PRP was represented by Carson. 
19. Carson owed PRP duties of loyalty, honesty, faithfulness and full disclosure. 
20. Carson owed SSD duties of honesty and full disclosure. 
A 
21. On or about October 11, 1996, Carson filled out and presented SSD with a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract for the Property which identified CMT as the buyer and offered to 
purchase the Property from SSD for $25,000 per building lot for a total of $1,800,000 
("the CMT offer"). 
22. Defendants, personally or through agents, told Cary and principals of SSD that CMT was 
affiliated with and a part of PRP. 
23. At all times SSD was advised and believed that CMT was affiliated with and was a part 
ofPRP. 
24. At the time SSD was considering the CMT offer, SSD had offers from other parties who 
wanted to purchase the Property. 
25. CMT in fact was not affiliated with nor a part of PRP and Defendants' representations to 
that effect were false. 
26. At the time CMT?s offer was presented to SSD, CMT was not incorporated or organized 
pursuant to the laws of Utah and was not authorized to do business in Utah as a foreign 
corporation. 
27. At no time since CMTfs offer was presented to SSD has CMT been incorporated or 
organized pursuant to the laws of Utah or been authorized to do business in Utah as a 
foreign corporation. 
28. In reality, CMT was made up of one, all, or some group of Defendants who collectively 
defrauded SSD in the above manner. 
29. CMT's true identity was a fact that was material to SSDfs consideration of CMT's offer. 
30. Based upon Defendants' misrepresentations and SSD's reasonable understanding and 
belief about CMTfs identity, affiliation and association with PRP, SSD continued to 
negotiate with CMT and on November 4, 1996, agreed to enter into a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract with CMT for the purchase of the Property ("the SSD/CMT 
Contract"). 
31. The SSD/CMT Contract provided, in part, that CMT would pay SSD $ 1,800,000 for the 
Property. 
32. The SSD/CMT Contract has been partially performed. 
33. The lack of CMTfs corporate status makes the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT 
Contract voidable. 
34. Defendants1 fraudulent misrepresentations regarding CMT's true identity and affiliations 
makes the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract voidable. 
35. SSD wishes to void all unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract. 
36. If Defendants had not fraudulently misrepresented the true identity of CMT to SSD, SSD 
would not have agreed to sell the Property for $1,800,000, but would have demanded that 
the price for the property be increased to at least $2,160,000 or $30,000 per lot. 
37. If Defendants had not improperly interjected CMT into the negotiations between SSD 
and PRP, SSD would have sold the Property to PRP for $2,160,000 or $30,000 per lot. 
38. If Defendants had not improperly interjected CMT into the negotiations between SSD 
and PRP, PRP would have purchased the Property from PRP for $2,160,000 or $30,000 
per lot. 
39. Upon information and belief Defendants told PRP that CMT was affiliated with and a 
part of SSD. 
40. Upon information and belief, PRP and its principals were advised and believed that CMT 
was affiliated with and a part of SSD. 
41. Upon information and belief, Defendants knew when the CMT offer was presented to 
SSD that SSD had offers from other parties who wanted to purchase the Property. 
42. CMT in fact was not affiliated with nor a part of SSD and Defendants' representations to 
that effect were false. 
43. Upon information and belief CMT's true identity was a fact that was material to PRP's 
consideration of CMT's offer. 
44. Upon information and belief, PRP continued to negotiate with CMT for the purchase of 
the Property because of Defendants' misrepresentations about CMT's true identity, 
affiliation and association with SSD and on November 5, 1996, PRP agreed to enter into 
a Real Estate Purchase Contract with CMT for the Property ("the CMT/PRP Contract"). 
45. The CMT/PRP Contract provided that PRP would pay CMT $2,160,000 for the Property. 
46. The CMT/PRP Contract has been partially performed. 
47. The lack of CMT's corporate status makes the unperformed portions of the CMT/PRP 
Contract voidable. 
48. Carson's, Perez's and CMT's fraudulent representations regarding CMT's true identity and 
affiliations makes the unperformed portions of the CMT/PRP Contract voidable. 
49. Upon information and belief, PRP wishes to void all unperformed portions of the 
CMT/PRP Contract. 
50. Defendants were negotiating to purchase the Property from SSD at the same time they 
were negotiating to sell the Property to PRP. 
51. Defendants fraudulently misrepresented the true identity and affiliations of CMT in order 
to mislead SSD and PRP and to benefit themselves at the expense of SSD and PRP. 
52. As a real estate agent licensed with the State of Utah, Carson was legally and ethically 
prohibited from fraudulently misrepresenting the true character, identity and affiliations 
of CMT to either SSD or PRP. 
53. As a real estate agent licensed with the State of Utah, Carson was legally and ethically 
prohibited interjecting himself or others into the negotiations between SSD and PRP, 
thereby usurping SSD's and PRP's opportunities for himself and/or others. 
54. Defendants interjected themselves into the ongoing negotiations of SSD and PRi* to 
benefit themselves at the expense of SSD and PRP. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Fraud) 
55. Paragraphs 1 through 54 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth 
herein. 
56. Defendants affirmatively represented to SSD that CMT was affiliated with and a part of 
PRP while negotiating to purchase the Property from SSD. 
57. The true identity, character, affiliation and nature of CMT were material facts which SSD 
relied upon when it continued to negotiate with and agreed to enter a contract with CMT 
for the sale/purchase of the Property. 
58. CMT was not affiliated with or a part of PRP. 
59. Defendants knew CMT was not a part of or affiliated with PRP. 
60. Defendants intended for SSD to rely upon their misrepresentation of the nature, character, 
identity and affiliation of CMT so that SSD would sell the Property to CMT rather than to 
PRP. 
61. SSD reasonably relied upon Defendants' misrepresentations regarding CMT, and did not 
know those representations were false when it negotiated with and agreed to enter a 
contract with CMT. 
62. SSD suffered losses of at least $360,000 as a result of Defendants' fraudulent 
misrepresentations. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Civil Conspiracy) 
63. Paragraphs 1 through 50 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth 
herein. 
64. Defendants conspired and agreed to act and conduct themselves in a manner so as to 
prevent SSD from learning of the true nature of CMT and thereby prevented SSD from 
selling the Property to PRP for $2,160,000. 
65. One or more of the Defendants' conduct was unlawful. 
66. SSD suffered losses of at least $360,000 as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' 
civil conspiracy to defraud SSD and obtain an interest in the Property by deceit and false 
pretense. 
67. Defendants are obligated to reimburse SSD for the profits it would have made if they had 
not conspired to defraud SSD. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Commercial Bribery) 
68. Paragraphs 1 through 67 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth 
herein. 
69. Utah Code Anno § 76-6-508 prohibits anyone from conferring or offering an employee, 
agent or fiduciary a benefit to influence the employee's, agent's or fiduciary's conduct 
relating to his employer's or principal's affairs without the consent of the employer or 
principal and contrary to the interests of the employer or principal. 
70. Upon information and belief, one or more of the Defendants offered or conferred a 
benefit upon Carson without the knowledge or consent of PRP or Wardley (Carson's Real 
Estate Broker) to the detriment of both PRP and Wardley. 
71. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' illegal inducement or confirmation of a 
benefit upon Carson, SSD suffered losses of at least $360,000. 
72. Those Defendants are obligated to reimburse SSD for the profits it would have earned if 
they had not committed commercial bribery of Carson. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Commercial Bribery—Carson) 
73. Paragraphs 1 through 72 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth 
herein. 
74. Utah Code Anno § 76-6-508 prohibits an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an employer or 
principal, from soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit from another upon 
an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in relation to 
his employer's or principal's affairs, without the knowledge and consent of the employer 
or principal and contrary to the interests of the employer or principal. 
75. Upon information and belief, Carson solicited, accepted or agreed to accept a benefit 
from one or more of the Defendants in order to influence his conduct in relation to his 
employer's and principal's affairs, without the knowledge or consent of PRP or Wardley 
1 n 
(Carson's Real Estate Broker) to the detriment of both PRP and Wardley. 
76. As a direct and proximate result of Carson's solicitation, acceptance or agreement to 
accept an illegal inducement, SSD suffered losses of at least $360,000. 
77. Carson is obligated to reimburse SSD for the profits it would have earned if Carson had 
not committed commercial bribery. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Interference with Contract) 
78. Paragraphs 1 through 77 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth 
herein. 
79. SSD and PRP were involved in negotiations that would have culminated in a contract 
whereby SSD would have sold the Property to PRP for $2,160,000. 
80. Defendants interjected themselves into those contractual negotiations in order to enrich 
themselves at the expense of SSD, 
81. As a result of Defendants' interference with SSD's prospective economic relations with 
PRP, SSD did not enter into a contract with PRP to sell it the Property for $2,160,000. 
82. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' interference with SSD's prospective 
economic relations with PRP, SSD lost $360,000. 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Unjust Enrichment) 
83. Paragraphs 1 through 82 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth 
herein. 
84. Defendants benefitted as a result of their fraud, civil conspiracy, commercial bribery and 
interference with SSD's prospective economic relations. 
1 1 
85. Defendants should be required to disgorge any and all benefits they received, including 
any compensation, commissions, kickbacks, profits or other advantages they received as a 
result of their wrongful conduct. 
SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Rescission of the Contract) 
86. Paragraphs 1 through 85 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth 
herein. 
87. SSD agreed to the SSD/CMT Contract only because it believed and understood that CMT 
was affiliated with and a part of PRP. 
88. SSD's belief and understanding regarding the nature, character and affiliation of CMT 
came directly from Defendants and was reasonable. 
89. In reality, CMT was not affiliated with or a part of PRP and was not and is not even a 
distinct legal entity as far as the State of Utah is concerned, in that it is not organized or 
incorporated pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah or registered to do business within 
the State of Utah as a foreign corporation. 
90. If SSD had known that CMT was not affiliated with or a part of PRP, or that it was not a 
legitimate corporation authorized to do business within the State of Utah, SSD would not 
have agreed to sell the Property to CMT. 
91. SSD's unilateral mistake of fact justifies rescission of the unperformed portions of the 
SSD/CMT Contract. 
92. Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the true nature, character and 
affiliation of CMT justify rescission of the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT 
Contract. 
1? 
93. Defendants' civil conspiracy to defraud SSD justifies rescission of the unperformed 
portions of the SSD/CMT Contract. 
94. Defendants' commercial bribery justifies rescission of the unperformed portions of the 
SSD/CMT Contract. 
95. Recission of the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract would not prejudice 
CMT. 
96. Forcing SSD to fulfill the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract would 
severely prejudice SSD while unjustly enriching Defendants. 
97. The SSD/CMT Contract should be rescinded. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, SSD requests the following relief: 
1. That a money judgment be entered in favor of SSD and against Defendants jointly 
and severally in the amount of $360,000; 
2. That Defendants be required to disgorge any compensation, commission, benefit, 
profits, payments, kickbacks or other benefits gained as a result of their wrongful conduct. 
3. Treble Damages for Fraud. 
4. Punitive damages as determined by the Court. 
5. That SSD be awarded prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 10% from the 
date of the SSD/CMT Contract until the date of judgment, and post-judgment interest thereafter 
at the statutory rate until paid in full; 
6. That the unperformed portions of the SSD/CMT Contract be rescinded; 
7. That SSD be awarded its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred to 
prosecute this action; 
8. That an order be entered allowing SSD to augment any judgment obtained in the 
amount of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended to collect or enforce the judgment by 
execution or otherwise as established by SSD or SSD's counsel without further notice to 
Defendants; 
9. For such other and further relief deemed just and appropriate by the Court. 
DATED this T^day of June 2000. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Steven B.Smith 
Darwin H. Bingham j4tft*£vi 
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PURCHASE A N D DEVELOPMENT A G R E E M E N T 
&A " ^ / ^ ^ D e v e i ° P m e n t Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into this 
eL day of April 1997 by and between PRP Development, LC ("PRP"), a Utah Limited Liability 
Company Ru^l-P*kard Development, Inc. ("RPD, a California Corporation, Premier Homes 
ConstrucQon, LC. ( Premier"), a Utah Corporation and Lawrence M. Russell ("Russell") 
Premier Homes, LC and Premier Homes Construction, LC are two separate entities. 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Russell and Premier Homes, LC are the sole members of PRP, and 
WHEREAS, Russell desires to sell all of his right, title and interest in PRP to Premier on 
the terms and conditions set forth herein, and 
_ WHEREAS, Russell desires the right to acquire from PRP Lots 1 to 72 in the Saratoga 
Springs Subdivision, Phase 1 located in Utah County, Utah (said lots are hereinafter collectively 
referred to the "Saratoga Property"and the individual lots are referred to as the '"Lots") pursuant 
to the terms of a real estate purchase contract ("Contract") sisned by PRP on November 5,1996 
and signed by CMT Investments as Seller on November 8,1996 which Contract names PRP as 
Buyer, and 
WHEREAS. Russell is willing to pay PRP to acquire said Property. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants and promises set forth herein, the 
parties mutually agree as follows: 
1. Purchase of Interest in PRP. Premier agrees to pay and Russell agrees to accept the sum 
of $5,000 for Russell's remaining interest in PRP. Russell shall transfer it's interest in PRP 
to Premier at the time of closing. Premier shall pay Russell the purchase price at the time 
of closing. The parties represent that the purchase prices set forth herein represents a fair 
estimate of the value of Russell's remaining interest in PRP as of the date hereof. 
Saratoga Pmpenv PRP agrees to assign to Russell all of its right, tide and interest in the 
Contract and its right to acquire the Saratoga Property at the time of closing. Russell 
agrees to ray PRP the sum of $528,000 for PRP's interest in the Saratoga Property. Said 
sum shall be paid as follows: 
a. Russell shall pay PRP the sum of 58,000 for each Lot on 66 Lots of the Saratoga 
Property. In such an event, Russell shall be entitled to sell the first 6 lots without 
making any payment to PRP. On the last 66 lots, Russell shall pay PRP the sum of 
1 
S8,000 at the time of closing of the sale of each Lot No interest shall accrue on 
the unpaid balance. 
b. In the event Russell sells, assigns or transfers the Saratoga Property other than 
through the sale of an individual Lot, the amounts due PRP shall become due and 
payable upon such in such event. 
c. The amounts due PRP shall be secured by a standard trust deed and trust deed 
note in favor of PRP to be recorded after the closing of the construction loan ' 
and/or an escrow arrangmcnt at American Legal Title, acceptable to PRP, which 
arrangment provides for the payment of $8,000 to PRP upon the sale of each Lot. 
d. Russell shall have until April 1,1999 to pay the principal sum of S528s000 at no 
interest. Interest shall accrue after April 1,1999 at the rate of S percent per annum 
on the unpaid principal balance. After April 1,2000, the principal sum, together 
with all accrued interest, shall become due and payable 
Disclaimer of Interest. As a material part of the consideration of this Agreement, Russell 
and RPI acknowledge and agree that upon the consummation of the transaction set forth 
in this Agreement, neither Russell nor RPI shall have any farther interest in and to PRP or 
any of its assets, projects or properties. 
Notice. All demands and notices to be given hereunder, if any, shall be personally 
delivered or sent by registered mail addressed to the respective parties at their postal 
addresses as of the date of this Agreement or to such other address as each may hereafter 
designate in writing. 
Successors. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of the respective parties hereto, their legal representatives, 
successors and assigns. 
Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding 
between the parties hereto and supersedes all prior agreements or understandings. 
Amendment. This Agreement may not be altered or amended except by a subsequent 
written agreement executed by all of the parties hereto. 
Attonevrs fees. In the event of any controversy or claim dr dispute between the parties 
hereto arising out of or relating to this Agreement or any of the documents provided for 
herein, or the breach thereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the 
losing party reasonable attorneys' fees, expenses and costs, whether incurred prior to, 
during or subsequent to trial including appeals. 
16 
Additional Documents. The parties hereto agree to execute such additional documents as 
may be necessary or desirable to carry out the intent of this Agreement. 
Nonwaiver The failure of any parry to enforce the provisions of this Agreement shall not 
constitute a waiver unless specifically stated in writing, signed by the party whose rights 
are deemed waived, regardless of a party's knowledge of a breach hereunder. 
Governing Law, The terms of the Agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with Utah law. The parties agree that any legal proceedings relating to the 
subject matter of this Agreement shall be brought exclusively in the Sta^ e of Utah. The 
parties represent to each other that the Agreement to bring legal proceedings exclusively 
in the State of Utah will not place a serious inconvenience or be unfair or unreasonable to 
any of the parties hereto. Because the State of Utah has a substantial relationship to both 
the parties and this transaction, it is appropriate to select the Utah Courts to handle any 
and all legal proceedings relating hereto. 
Severability. If any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be declared invalid 
by a court, agency, commission or other tribunal or entity having jurisdiction thereof, the 
application of such provisions to parties or circumstances other than those as to which it is 
held invalid or unenforceable shall not be affected thereby, and each of them not so 
declared invalid or unenforceable shall be valid and be enforced to the fullest extent 
permitted by law and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be reasonable terms 
consistent with the undertakings of the parties under this Agreement has been substituted 
in place of the invalid provision. 
Paragraph Headings. Paragraph headings in this Agreement are for convenience only and 
shall not be deemed to modify, interpret or limit the provisions hereof. 
Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of 
which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall be deemed to be one and 
the same instrument. 
Time of the Essence. Time is of the essence in this Agreement 
Authorization. The 'individuals who have signed this Agreement represent and warrant 
that they are duly authorized to execute this Agreement, in either their individual or 
representative capacity as indicated, and that this Agreement is enforceable according to 
its terms. 
Survival. The provisions, promises, warranties, representations, and covenants set forth 
herein shall survive any execution, settlement, delivery or recording of any instrument and 
shall not be merged therein. 
3 
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18. Legal CounseL The parties hereto have engaged the law firm of Caiman & Associates, 
P.C. to prepare this Agreement. AJ1 parties acknowledge that they have been advised to 
seek independent legal advice to represent their individual interests to'the extent they 
deem it necessary. 
19, Costs. Eacfc of the parties shall pay their own costs and expenses incurred, or to be 
inclined, in negotiating and preparing this Agreement and in closing and carrying out the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement on the day and year 
above written. 
PRP Develooment, LC rKf Develoo ent, LC 
Rnssell-PackardiJevelopment, Inc. 
Premier Homes Construction, LC 
: M. Russell 
4 
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OLD REPUBLIC 
Title Company of Utah 
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RECORDED FOR QL& REPUBLIC T I T U OF WAH 
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WARRANTY DEED 
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Grantee: 
f. ^ 1 > U lTC 
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r 
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Ujr THFiio 1
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97060145 
SARATOGA SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C. 
ot SALT J A K E CITY .County of 
CONVEY AND WARRANT to 
CMT DEVELOPMENT, I N C . 
SALT LAKE 
grantor 
, State of Utah hereby 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 
TEN AND NO/TOOTHS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION-
grantee 
for the sum of 
— DOLLARS 
the followmR described tract of land in 
State of Utah-
UTAH County, 
LOTS 61,62,63,64 CONTAINED WITHIN SARATOGA SPRINGS, PLAT 4, SHEET 2, A PLANNED 
UNIT DEVELOPMENT, AS SAID LOT IS IDENTIFIED IN THE PLAT OF SAID DEVELOPMENT, 
RECORDED JUNE 25, 1997, AS ETNRY NO. 48291 OF PLATS, IN THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH 
COUNTY RECORDER, AND AS FURTHER DEFINED AND DESCRIBED IN THE DECLARATION OF 
COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS OF SARATOGA SPRINGS DEVELOPMENT RECORDED 
FEBRUARY 19, 1997 AS ENTRY NO. 12514 IN BOOK 4195 AT PAGE 001 OF THE OFFICIAL 
RECORDS, AND IN ANY SUPPLEMENTS THERETO. 
TOGETHER WITH A RIGHT AND EASEMENT OF USE AND ENJOYMENT IN AND TO THE COMMON 
AREAS DESCRIBED AND PROVIDED FOR IN THE SAID DECLARATION AND ANY SUPPLEMENTS 
THERETO. 
SUBJECT TO CURRENT GENERAL TAXES, EASEMENTS, RESTRICTIONS AND RIGHTS OF WAY 
OF RECORD. 
WITNESS, the hand ot said ^rantoj , this 
JULY 
Signed in the Presence ot 
I st day of 
, A D 19 97 
STATE OF I HAH. 
County ot 
On the 
personall> appeared before me 
da\ ot , A.D. 19 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to mc that he executed the same 
Notarv Public 
M\ commission expires . Residing in . 
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STATE OF i tt£X/^ ( 
COUNTY OF3t lM: UQKQ 
SS: 
ONTHEjirX 
BEFORE ME_y 
\CH FOR HI 
)MH2 
XuLL 
EMT 5 1 0 8 4 M 4 3 1 2 P6 7 1 2 
_ , 1997, PERSONALLY APPEARED 
WHO BEING DULY SWORN DID SAY, 
BER/MANAGER OF ^n^nXOT^CX 
HE WITHIN AND FOREGOING 
APANY JTRUMENT WAS SIGNED ON BEHALF OF SAID LIMITED UABILITY COM 
BY AUTHORITY OF ITS ARTICLES OR ORGANIZATION AND EACH DULY 
ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME THAT SAID LIMITED LIABILITY COMPAQ EXECUTED 
THE SAME 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RESIDING IN 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: s-i -ns 
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TATE OF UTAH 
OJivTYOf U»AH 
' H= UN DF^ 5 IG-T0 RECORDER OF UTAH COUNTY UTAH 
n - n E ! ! N o W F v SI.AT T HE AHfiEXEO AND FOREGOING IS A 
UL crr-> or i r :^i
 (.. »,<L S?CORDLD D O C U M E N T IN THE 
r
«Ct P^CoHO *ri >'> Q«' rlCt ^ THt SAME APPEARS IN 
^MD/xl . A oCVIfSrD.M FtCORDbtf 
h A i ^ O ^ - OEPUTY 
When Recorded Mail To: 
Uussell/Paeknrd'slnkcshorc 
@Sarntoga Springs, L*C. 
lOtp'H so HighloLi^ L & 
Order No. 33355 
REDDED FOR AHEftfCAN LCGAt TITLE 
Space above this line for Recorder's u<>e 
Warranty Deed 
CMT DEVELOPMENT, INC., CRANTOR(S) 
hcicby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO 
IUJSSELL/PACKAttD'S LAKESHORE @ SARATOGA SPRINGS, L.C., GRANTRK(S) 
for the sum of ($10.00) Ten Dollars and other good and valuable considerations the following described 
tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
See attached Exhibit "A" 
Tax ID No. 
WITNESS the hand of said Grantor this July 1,1997 
CMT DEVELOPMENT,, INC, 
"•—3-
State of Utah } 
tF~? 
A *4*c. 
.. i ^ J t l * ^ 
County of Salt Lake 
}ss. 
On the July 1,1997 personally appeared before me, _ C- * l^fljrg>sg— 
by me duly sworn, did say, that such person(s) is/are the TAJL&AAA*^ 
, who being 
_ ofCMT 
DEVELOPMENT, INC., a corporation, and that the within and foregoing instalment was signed in 
behalf of said corporation by authority of its By-Laws or by a resolution of its board of directors and the 
said (L* ^ ^^V^** acknowledged to me that the said corporation executed the 
Witness my hand and official seal. 
~ > ~ ^ LORIfc-PYMM I 
dFJS&s, •WMy*HJBi)C.8WE«ftniH • fcffih&M SUPERIOR TITLE CO. 
XA P j S If) 7053 3a U JltOH PMW CHTR fill 
y&^3& WOYAU, UT MM? 
^ ^ E S / COUU. EXPIRES W W * 
Nytaiy Publi 
JU fcJfcttV^ 
21 
SUPERIOR TITLE COMPfiNY Fax:8015565541 Jul 3 '9? 10:44 P.02 
EHT 5 1 3 0 1 W 4 3 1 3 PG 3 5 0 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
EXHIBIT A 
Order No. 33116 
Lots 61,62,63 aud 64 contained within the SARATOGA SPRINGS PLAT 4, 
SHEET 2, Planned Unit Development, as the same is identified in the Plat recorded 
June 25,199? as Entry No. 48290 in the office of the County Recorder of Utah 
County, Utah, and in the "Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restriction* of 
tbe SARATOGA SPRINGS SUBDIVISIONS, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Utah County, Utah in Book 4195, Page 1. 
TOGETHER WITH a right and easement of use and enjoyment in and to the 
common areas described and as provided for in said Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions. 
22 
T ^ R O ^ . J T A w COUNTY IJIAH 
•OTiUfci.Ql.v.GiSA 
CU«E*»Tii>llHE 
APPEARS W 
JL 
•iTiL^iv,' HAIMJ,II OC'*L ) r c* 'uO r r n- n- s .,5"2 i^~ 
, f _JLci»r.U6-C4L.. _ ._ ._J)A3 
V ' H L L > U ^ l C I O N RECORDbP 
JUL*^ . LQAZU-O,, DEPUTY 
JUN-22-00 13:16 PROW- I LAW FIRM 8 0 1 3 5 J T-282 p 02/14 HT74 
RffAT PRQFERT1V PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS R E A L PROPERTY PURCHASE AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is made and 
entered into as of the 22>rtdl day of/one, 2000, by and between Saratoga Springs 
Development, LX,C, a Utah limited liability company (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the 
"Seller"), as Seller; and Russell/Packard Development, Inc,, a California Corporation 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as The *Buyer"), as Buyer. 
RECITALS: 
A. WHEREAS, Seller owns teal property in Utah Counly more particularly 
described on record at the Utah County Recorder's Office as follows: 
Plat 4, Sheet 2, Saratoga Springs Planned Unit Development, Lots 
23,24,25,26,27,28,33,34,35, 36, 37 and 38 (the "Property"). 
B. Buyer desires to purchase the Property for the purchase price and on the terms and 
conditions set forth in this Agreement, and Seller is willing to sell the Property to Buyer on the 
terms, provisions, and conditions contained in this Agreement, 
C. Seller previously e m ~ ^ _ ^ _ Heal Estate Purchase Contract for the Property 
with CMT. , Inc, However, Seller claixhs that such contract is no longer in effect and has been 
terminated by Seller because of claims, irregularities and breaches by C.M.T., Inc. and others 
< 
(collectively referred to as " C M l , Inc.!"), Buyer also may have claims against C.MX, Inc. 
relating to the purchase of the Property. jThe alleged breaches by C M J , , Inc. have resulted in 
i 
Seller selling the Property for less than h reasonably would have otherwise and Buyer paying 
more for the Property than it reasonably would have otherwise. It is the inieni of both Buyer and 
1 
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Seller in execut ing this Agreement to minimize the losses occas ioned by the referenced breaches 
b y dividing the lo s se s equally. Buyer and Seller d o not intend to deprive C.M.T. , l a c . o f any 
money to which it is legally entitled and acknowledge that C.MX, Inc. has filed a Notice of 
Interest with respect to the Property, Seller having taken the position thai C.MT., Inc. has no 
further right to the Property has deemed it appropriate to enter into this Agreement and Buyer 
acknowledges that any issues relating to C.M.T., Inc., including matters relating to the Notice of 
Interest filed by C.MX, Inc., shall be resolved between the parties in accordance with the terms 
of this Agreement, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants, promises, obligations, 
and agreements set forth herein, and othdr good and valuable consideration, the receipt and 
sufficiency of which are acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Property, The definition i f the term ^Property*7 u sed in this Agreement, as set 
forth in paragraph A o f the Recitals aboye, is by this reference incorporated herein and made a 
part o f this Agreement . The Property sh i l l include, without limitation, the described real 
property, any improvements constructed;thetcon, and all rights and appurtenances pertaining 
Thereto, and any right, title, or interest o f Seller in and to adjacent streets or casements, al leys, 
i 
rights-of-way, or any other rights or interests o f the Property. 
2 . purchase Price: The purchase price for the Property shall be T w o Hundred Forty 
Thousand Dol lars ($240 ,000 .00 ) described as fo l lows: 
2 
24 
U 0 / U / / U 1 1 1 : 0 3 VAA 0U1 AOO £ 0 1 0 ^KAIb ADAMSUIN l£JUU4/U14 
JUN-ZZ-QQ 13:18 FROIKCIM w . , FIRM 5Q1363040Q T-2W P.Oi/14 F-7T4 
(a) Lots 23> 24,25,26,27 and 28 shall have a total purchase price of 
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00), or Twenty-Five Thousand 
Dollars ($25,000,00) per lot 
(b) Lots 33,34, 35.36,37 and 38 shall have a total purchase price of 
Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00), or Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) 
per lot, 
(c) Each lot shall be released upon die separate payment of the amount per lot 
specified. 
3, Seller's Warranties. Seller hereby represents and warrants to Buyer for the 
purpose of inducing Buyer to purchase the Property, and acknowledges that such representations 
and warranties are material to Buyer's decision to purchase the Property, as of the date hereof 
and as of the Closing Date as follows: 
(a) Seller has good and marketable fee simple record title to the 
Property. 
(b) Seller has all legal right, power, and authority to enter into this 
Agreement and to consummate x^c transactions contemplated hereby. The 
execution and delivery ofihis Ain-eement by Seller and consummation by Seller 
of the transactions contemplatedjhereby have been duly and validly authorized by 
all necessary corporate action oil behalf of Seller. This Agreement has been duly 
executed and delivered by Seller and it and all instruments and documents 
3 
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executed and delivered by Seller at the Closing, constitute and will constitute 
legal, valid, and binding agreements of Seller, enforceable in accordance with 
their respective terms. 
(c) Wardley/McLachlan Development, LX.C. is a managing member of Seller 
and has the necessary authority to sign this agreement on Seller's behalf. Scott C. McLachlan is 
a member of Wardley/McLachlan Development, L.L,C and has the necessary authority to sign 
this agreement on Wardley/McLachlan Development, LJLC/s behalf. 
(d) There are no municipal or other governmental assessments against the 
Property other than current real pibperty taxes and impact fees. Seller has not entered 
into any understanding or agreement with any taxing or assessing authority with respect 
to the imposition or deferment of jsny taxes or assessment relating to the Property, 
(e) In furtherance of its claim, Seller has commenced a lawsuit against 
C.M.T., Inc. in the Third Judicial ^ District Couit in and for Salt Lake County. 
which is numbered Q009<H607Ojl (the "Action"), Seller shall hold Buyer 
harmless and indemnify Buyer from any claims by C.MX, inc. against Buyer or 
its principals relating to the sale qf the Property to Buyer as described herein. 
Seller also agrees to the following; 
(1) Buyer will place Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) in an escrow 
account with Surety Title Company each time Buyer closes with a 
4 
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third party on a home built on one of the lots described above, for a 
total of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars ($120,000.00). 
(2) The funds In the escrow account shall remain in escrow until the 
Action has ^een fUlly and finally resolved by judgment, settlement, 
or otherwise. 
(3) If Seller prevails in the Action or CM.T.f Inc obtains a judgment 
against or receives a settlement from Seller totaling less than 
Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000,00), all of the funds in the 
escrow accbunt shall be returned to Buyer within ten days after full 
and final resolution of all claims, 
(4) If C.MT-, Inc. obtains a judgment against or receives a scttlem 
as related to the sale of the Property 
from Buyetf that judgment or sctdement shall be paid from the 
funds in the escrow account. If C.M.T., lncf obtains a judgment 
against or receives a settlement from Seller for Ninety Thousand 
Dollars ($£o,OQQ,0G) or more, Seller will pay the first Ninety 
Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) of the judgment or sctdement and 
the remaujing portion will be paid from any funds left in the 
escrow account. If there is a balance remaining in the escrow 
account after all judgments are satisfied, it shall be split equally 
between Buyer and Seller. 
5 
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(5) If C-MX, Inc. obtains a judgment against or receives a settlement 
from Seller in excess of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars 
($2IG,QOO.QO)> Seller shall be solely responsible for paying the 
portion of the judgment remaining after the One Hundred Twenty 
Thousand Dollars ($120,000-00) in escrow has been exhausted. 
(6) Buyer and Seller agree if one or both obtain a judgment against or 
receive a settlement from C.M.T., Inc. arising out of the alleged 
breaches described or referred to in the Action and the other 
matters tcf&red to herein, that the net proceeds of any and all 
amount <-^WT«M zfeT QQ^ m^ reasonable wonieys' fc*s 
incurred in! obtaining the judgments are deducted, will be 
combined and split equally between them. 
(7) Seller's anft Buyer's agreement to the above shall not be an 
admission that any such funds are owed or due C-MX> Inc. and 
shall not diminish the indemnity of Buyer by Seller herein nor be 
considered a waiver of any sort by Buyer or Seller-
(I) The above representations, obligations and warranties of Seller shall 
survive the expiration or termination of this Agreement the discharge of any other obligatioas 
owed by the parties to each other, and ttyc Closing and transfer of title to the Property to Buyer, 
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and shall not be affected by any investigation by or on behalf of Buyer, or by any information 
which Buyer may have or obtain with respect thereto, 
4. payer's Warranties. Buyer hereby represents and warrants to Seller for the 
purpose of induciog Seller to sell the Property, and acknowledges that such representations and 
warranties are material to Seller's decision to sell the Property, as of the date hereof and as of the 
Closing Da*c as follows. 
(a) Buyer has all right, title and interest to the Contract for the purchase the 
Property. 
(b) Buyer has all icgai<right, power, and authority to enter into this Agreement 
and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby. The execution 
and delivery of thi£ Agreement by Buyer and consummation by Buyer of 
the transactions contemplated hereby have been duly and validly 
authorized by all qecessary corporate action on behalf of Buyer, This 
Agreement has been duly executed and delivered by Buyer and it and all 
instruments and documents executed and delivered by Bayer at the 
Closing, constitute and will constitute legal, valid, and binding agreements 
of Seller, enforceable in accordance with their respective terms. 
5. Closing and Post Closing 
5,1. Closing. Closing 09 Buyer's purchase of the Property (hereinafter referred 
to as the '"Closing") shall be held at the Offices of Surety Title Company on June^fc^, 2000 at 
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_ pjn- or such other time and place as may be agreed to in writing by both Buyer and 
Seller and shall take place simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement. Closing may be 
accomplished on such date through an escrow established with the Surety Title Company, or 
another escrow agent approved in writing by Seller and Buyer, The date on which the Closing 
actually takes place, or if more than one day is required to complete the Closing, the date on 
which the Closing is actually accomplished is herein referred to and designated as the "Closing 
Date." At the Closing, the following shall occur, each action being considered a condition 
precedent to the others and all being considered as taking place simultaneously, and (subject to 
the terms and conditions hereof) each party covenanting to perform or cause to be performed 
each such action to be performed on its pan: 
(a) Buyer shall pay to1 Seller One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($150,000.00), or Tweaty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) per 
lot, for Lots 23.24,25,26,27 and 28. 
(b) Buyer shall pay tq Seller Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00), or 
Fifteen ThousandiDollars ($15,000.00) per lot, for Lots 33,34,35,36,37 
and 38. 
(c) Seller shall execute, acknowledge, and deliver to Buyer a Warranty 
Deed, conveying and warranting to Buyer fee simple title to the 
Property. 
(d) Seller shall deliver to Buyer possession of the Property. 
8 
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(e) Seller and Buyer stall execute and deliver to each other closing 
statements. 
(f) Each party shall ^t ,t acknowledge, and deliver such other 
documents and instruments and take such other action as the other party or its 
legal counsel may reasonably require in order to document and catty out the 
transactions contemplated in this Agreement. 
6. P^nflr'q Tilk InfftirePgff In conjunction with the Closing, Seller shall, at 
Seller's cost and expense, cause the Title!Company to issue and deliver to Buyer (as the named 
insured), a policy of title insurance, providing for standard coverage, in the amount of the 
purchase price of the Property, insuring tjiat fee simple title to the Property is vested in Buyer, 
Buyer shall pay the additional cost of any special endorsements or so-called "extended coverage" 
that Buyer may desire. 
7. General Provisions 
7.1 Real Estate Comqiteqionftl Seller represents and warrants to Buyer that Seller 
has engaged the services of a broker in connection with this Agreement, Seller shall be 
responsible for paying the brokers fee ahd shall indemnify, save, hold harmless, and defend 
Buyer from and against such claim if it is based upon any statement, representation, or agreement 
alleged to have been made by Seller. Byyer represents and warrants to Seller that Buyer has 
engaged no broker or finder in connection vvith this Agreement. Buyer shall be responsible for 
paying any broker's or finder's fee or cdramission, other than the fee of the broker engaged by 
9 
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Seller sex forth above, and shall indent*.,, -^*c, hold harmless, and defend Seller from and 
against such claim if it is based upon any statement, representation, or agreement alleged to have 
been made by Buyer, The provisions of this Section 7,1 shall survive the Closing or any 
termination of this Agreement. 
7.2 Interppflfljon. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance 
with the internal laws of the State of Utah. Whenever The conrext requires, the singular shall 
include the plural, the plural shall include the singular, the whole shall include any part thereof, 
any general shall include both other genders, and the term "person* shall include an individual, 
partnership (general or limited), corporation, limited liability company, trust, or other entity or 
association, or any combination thereof. The word "including" shall be interpreted to mean 
"including without limitation." The **, j *>ajcr" shall mean Buyer named herein or any 
assignee of Buyer, The section headingsl contained in this Agreement are for purposes of 
reference only and shall not limit, expand or otherwise affect the construction of any provisions 
of this Agreement This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and 
their respective successors and assigns. ;The provisions of this Agreement shall be construed 
both as covenants and conditions in the $ame manner as though the words imposing such 
covenants and conditions were u$ed in cfach separate provision hereof The exhibits referred to in 
this Agreement shall be incorporated into and shall be considered a pan hereof The provisions 
of this Agreement and the exhibits bereilo shall, when possible, be construed together in 
determining the intent of the parties. 
10 
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13 Assignment- Neither party shall assign any right, title, and interest under this 
Agreement to a third party without ibe written consent of both parties, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld- Notwithstanding the assignment of either party's interest hereunder, 
each party shall remain primarily responsible to the other party hereto for the performance of 
each and every obligation of such party under this Agreement. 
7.4 Consultation with Attorney. Each party represents that such party had 
opportunity to consult with legal counsel iof that party's choice concerning this Agreement prior 
to execution hereof. 
7.5 FflTJre Agrpflflient. This Agreement and die documents referenced herein 
contain the entire understanding of the parries hereto with tespect to the transactions 
contemplated hereby. All prior representjations, negotiations, agreements, and understandings of 
the parties are merged into this Agreement No change or modification to this Agreement shall 
he valid unless it is in a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. 
7>6 No Waiver. Acceptance by either party of any pcrfonnancc less than required 
hereby shall not be deemed to be a waiver of the rights of such party to enforce all of the terms 
and conditions hereof. No waiver of any such right hereunder shall be binding unless reduced to 
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith. 
7.7 Tnv^idity of yp^viaon. If any provisions of this Agreement as applied to 
any party or to any circumstance shall be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be 
void or unenforceable for any reason, the same shall in no way affeci (to the maximum extent 
U 
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permitted by applicable law) any other provision of this Agreement, the application of any such 
provision under circumstances different from those adjudicated by the courr, or the validity or 
enforceability of the Agreement as a whole. 
7.8 Time of the Bggence AS concerns all matters of notice and performance agreed 
upon hereunder, it is covenanted by the parties that time is strictly of the essence of this 
Agreement 
7.9 CftnfiflenpftliP/. Buyer and Seller agree that this Agreement shall be confidential 
and that neither the Agreement nor the teims hereof shall be disclosed to a third party except 
with the written consent of both parties at pursuant to a valid court order. 
7.10 Consolidation. Buyer and Seller will attempt to consolidate into one action any 
legal claims they may bring against CMJT.* Inc. or others arising out of the alleged breaches by 
CM.T>, Inc. and others. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Seller and Buyer have executed this Agreement as of the day 
and year first above written. 
12 
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S£UJER: 
Saratoga Springs Development. LX.C. RusseJUPickardlDevelopnjenj, toe. 
;ey/Mci«chlanDevtlc-r— r r C. £$$_—-fca^nee M. Eussell 
;ging Member Its: President 
By; Qmu C. MuLmlrtftu 
Member, Wardlcy/McLachlan Development, L.L.C. 
NMV59«\0O«\SAKATOaAAt» 
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V^VMIUCIISCII LAWRENCE RUSSEL 
Deposition of LAWRENCE RUSSELL, taken on behalf of 
Defendant, at the offices of DART, ADAMSON (, DONOVAN, 
3"?G East South Templf, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on O-tober 30, 2001, commencing at 11:00 a.m., before 
DONNA M. WARD, Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, pursuant to Nctice. 
APPEARANCES 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: FABIAN 6 CLENDENIN 
BY: SCOTT R. SABEtf, ESQ. 
215 South State, Twelfth Floor 
P.O. Bex 510210 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84151 
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FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
NEXUS INVESTMENTS, 
BUSTOS ENTERPRISES 
TRUST: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
FOR THE WITNESS: 
WILLIAM BUSTOS: POE INVESTMENTS; 
LLC; ARISTOTLE INVESTMENTS, INC.; 
, Ltd., AND WILLIAM A. BUSTOS F.AMILY 
DART, ADAMSON 6 DONOVAN 
BY: CRAIG J. WANGSGARD, ESQ. 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
JOEL M. CARSON: 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
BY: KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ. 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
BY: MICHAEL CARLSTON, ESQ. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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1 Salt Lake City, Utah, October 30, 2001 time a.m. 
2 LARRY RUSSELL 
3 was duly sworn, was examined and 
4 testified as follows: 
5 EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. WANGSGARD: 
7 Q. Could you state your name for the record. 
8 A. Lawrence Mark Russell. 
9 Q. Mr. Russell, have you ever had your deposition 
10 taken before? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. I'm going to lay out a few ground rules. If 
13 you wait until I finish a question, I'll wait until you 
14 answer and that way we will have a clear record for the 
15 court reporter. If you don't understand a question, 
16 please feel free to tell me you don't understand and 
17 I'll rephrase it or do whatever I can so you understand 
18 it better. 
19 Do you have any questions before we start? 
A. No. 
Q. What is your address, Mr. Russell? 
A. My residence address? 
Q. Yes. 
A. 2221 Hollister Terrace, Glendale, California 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 91206. 
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Q. Do you have a Utah address? 
A. I do. 
Q. And what is that? 
A. 368 Bay Side Drive, Saratoga Springs 84043. 
Q. Do you know a gentleman named John Thomas? 
A. I do. 
Q. How did you meet Mr. Thomas? 
A. He contacted me via telephone. 
Q. When was that? 
A. It would have been, as memory serves, early in 
the 1990s, perhaps 1992, 1993, probably 1993, 1994. 
Q. Were you in California at the time of the 
telephone conversation? 
A. I was. 
Q. Where in California were you? 
A. I was probably in my office in Fontana, 
California, when he called. 
Q. Do you still have an office in Fontana, 
California? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Do you still have an office in California? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Do you have an office in Utah? 37 
24 A. I do. 
25 O Ts i t t h e c a m p ac *ki» nAA* 
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1 you bought them from? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Any other business dealings with Lynn Wardley? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Any other business -
6 A. I'm sorry, Craig, I've bought property, another 
7 property, from Lynn Wardley, directly from Lynn Wardley, 
8 although it may be a partnership also, I don't know, but 
9 it's the Marina Village Project, and I don't know what 
10 the legal description of it is. Oh, yeah, it's Plat 4 
111 or Amended Plat 4, Phase III, PUD Saratoga Springs, Lots 
12 1 -- I don't know what the lot numbers are but there are 
13 approximately 33 lots that I bought from him there. ' 
14 Q. And that purchase was not from SSD? 
15 A. It might have been from SSD or it might have 
16 been from Lynn Wardley. I don't remember. 
17 Q. Would you have documents that would tell you 
; 18 who you bought it from? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Any other business dealings with Lynn Wardley 
21 that you know of? 
!22 A. No. 
23 Q. Are there any other business dealings you may 
124 have had with an entity you believed to be owned by Lynn 
25 Wardley? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Just to be clear, any business dealings with 
3 any entity that you believed to be part owned by Lynn 
4 Wardley? 
5 A. Well, I don't know. You know, I bought 66 lots 
6 in North Ogden through Joe Colosimo, who I think at the 
7 time I purchased the lots was an agent with the Wardley 
8 outfit. I don't know if that qualifies. 
9 Q. No. 
10 A. That would be the only instance that I can 
11 think of. 
12 Q. In the transition that's the subject of the 
13 matter of this litigation, you ultimately bought 72 town 
14 home lots; is that correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. The final 12 lots, were they bought directly 
17 from SSD? 
18 MR. CARLSTON: I object to the characterization. It 
19 assumes facts not in evidence. 
20 BY MR. WANGSGARD: 
21 Q. Please answer the question. 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Prior to closing on those 12 lots, how did the 
24 purchase from SSD come about? Did you approach them to 
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1 A. What lots are you talking about? 
2 Q. I'm talking about the 72 town home lots. The 
3 final 12 lots that you purchased, they were directly 
4 from SSD; correct? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Did you approach them to purchase the lots or 
7 did they approach you to sell the lots? 
8 A. I don't remember. 
9 Q. Do you have any documents that might reflect to 
10 help you to recall? 
11 A. I don't think so. It was a complicated issue 
12 and I really don't recall how it came about. 
13 Q. Here is a document to be marked Exhibit 5. 
14 (Whereupon Defendant's Exhibit No. 5 was marked 
15 for identification.) 
16 BY MR. WANGSGARD: 
17 Q. Do you recognize this document? 
18 A. I do. 
19 Q. To the best of your knowledge is this the 
20 document that reflects the purchase of the contract to 
21 purchase the 12 lots, the final 12 lots? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Do you know who prepared this document? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. V/ho prepared this document? 
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1 A. Michael Carlston. 
2 Q. Were you a party to the negotiations that 
3 ultimately resulted in this document? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Who were those negotiations with, between you 
6 and who else? 
7 A. My primary contact was with Peter Staks. I did 
8 have conversations with Lynn Wardley, but Peter Staks 
9 carried the bulk of the load initially and then we 
10 turned it over to our representative attorneys to 
11 finalize it. 
12 Q. Do you remember who their attorney was? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Who did you discuss purchase price with? 
15 A. Well, either Lynn Wardley or Peter Staks, those 
16 are the only two people that I had any discussion with 
17 on this. 
18 Q. Do you recall who you discussed the purchase 
19 price with? 
20 A. I do not. 
21 Q. Do you recall the substance of your discussions 
22 or negotiations with Lynn Wardley? 38 
23 A. Yeah, it isn't all that earth shattering. He 
24 called me at home one evening. He was very upset and he 
25 caught me at a time that I was very upset because we 
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